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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 16017

VS.

ROBERT R. SATHER and
BONNIE LEE SATHER,
Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT OF
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE

STATE!1ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the ownership of and the respective
interests of the parties in and to real property situate in
Uintah County, State of Utah.

Plaintiff claims damages from

defendants for taking possession of said property, and defendants
SATHER claim reimbursement from the plaintiff for money with
interest thereon advanced for plaintiff's benefit by defendants
SATHER in connection with said land.
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT
The case was tried to a jury upon special

interroga~ .•

tories.
The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the real
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

property and was entitled ta possession thereof upon its pnying
to the defendants SATHER, the sum of $21,500.00.

The jury

further found that defendant ROBERT R. SATHER had acted "wilfully
and maliciously" tmvard the plaintiff in taking possession of
said property, but a\Varded no damages to the plaintiff as a
consequence thereof.

The trial court, upon motion of the

defendants after the jury had been discharged, declined to
allow defendant's interest on the money found by the jury to
be due from the plaintiff to the defendants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the jury finding that
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER \Vas guilty of "wilful and malicious"
conduct toward the plaintiff; defendants seek a determination
that the plaintiff owes defendants the sum of $46,560.00 for
money advanced for plaintiff's benefit by the defendants; and
defendants seek a further determination that defendants are
entitled to interest on the sums owing from plaintiff to the
defendants.

Defendants, in the alternative, seek a new trial

on such issues.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 11, 1972, the plaintiff signed a note in
favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH (EX 22-P; TR-29),
which note was secured by a trust deed to the real property
involved in this suit.

This real property is referred to by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the parties as the Moss Ranch.
but also on October 11,

1972~

In a separate transaction,
plaintiff and the defendant

ROBERT R. SATHER entered i~to an Agreement which in essence
provided that since the defendants SATHER had guaranteed
plaintiff's payment of said note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK,
if plaintiff failed to pay such note according to its terms
and the defendants were required to pay off that note by reason
of the said guarantee, defendant SATHER was to receive a
Warranty Deed to the same property as that covered by the Trust
Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK

(EX 22-P).

Plaintiff also on

October 11, 1972, executed a Warranty Deed in favor of defendant
SATHER covering the same property known as the Moss Ranch (EX 32-P;
TR-63).

The said Agreement and the Warranty Deed were both

delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in conjunction with said
Trust Deed (TR-62).
The note of October 11, 1972, was subsequently
refinanced and additional money was loaned by the FIRST SECURITY
BANK to the plaintiff on September 15, 1973.

On that date,

plaintiff signed another Trust Deed Note in the sum of $50,000.00
in favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 24-P; TR-98), $20,000.00
of which constituted a renewal of the earlier note and $30,000.00
of which was a new loan (EX 23-P; TR-31).

The new note was

likewise secured by a Trust Deed dated dated September 15, 1973,
covering the Moss Ranch upon which the FIRST SECURITY BANK was
designated as beneficiary (EX 37-D; TR-67,68).

The $30,000.00

of new money was credited to the account of the plaintiff at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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FIRST SECURITY BANK, Roosevelt, Utah (TR-67).

Also, on

September 15, 1973, plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER
entered into an Agreement similar to their earlier arrangement,
which Agreement provided that in consideration of the defendant's
guarantee of payment,

should the plaintiff default in timely

payment to the FIRST SECURITY BANK, and should the defendants
pay off the note pursuant to their guarantee, the FIRST SECURITY
BANK was to deliver the lvarranty Deed of October ll, 1972, to
defendant SATHER (EX 3-P; TR-24).

The original of this second

Agreement between plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was
concurrently delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK with the
Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiff (TR-24).
In furtherance of the said Agreement, the defendants
SATHER on September 21, 1973, executed and delivered to the FIRST
SECURITY BANK a guaranty document in favor of the FIRST SECURITY
BANK, whereby the defendants agreed to absolutely guarantee
payment of all sums the plaintiff then owed or should ever owe
to the FIRST SECURITY BANK.

This guaranty was for an unlimited

amount (EX 42-D; TR-31).
On September 25, 1973, plaintiff issued its check
payable to defendant ROBERT R. SATHER for the sum of $25,000.00,
which check was drawn on the Roosevelt Utah office of the FIRST
SECURITY BANK (EX 31-P).

Plaintiff contended at the trial that

this money was a loan to enable defendant Sather to buy diamonds
and to cover some overdraft checks (TR-64-66).

Defendant SATHER

contended that the money '"as given to him by plaintiff tmvard~ ..
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repayment of prior debts o>va,d to the defendant SATHER by th~
plaintiff and plaintiff's president, Pete Buffo (TR-257,258;
EX 60-D; TR-106).
On September 25, 1973, defendant SATHER, using said
check given him by the plaintiff, purchased Savings Certificate
No. 19479

in

the ar:~ount of $25,000.00 from the FIRST SECURITY

BANK (EX 56-P; TR-30,31), and immediately pledged said
certificate to the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security
for the plaintiff's $50,000.00 loan which had been guaranteed
by the defendants (EX 24-P; EX 23-P; EX 68-P; TR-161,162,258,
259).
By March 1974, plaintiff was in default in making
timely payments on the note of September 15, 1973, to the FIRST
SECURITY BANK (TR-136,261).

On March 15, 1974, defendant SATHER

paid off the existing unpaid balance of said note to the FIRST
SECURITY BANK in the sum of $46,560.00 pursuant to defendants'
guaranty (EX 49-P; TR-39,143,194,260,261; EX 27-P).

In making

said payoff, defendant SATHER cashed in and applied the said
Savings Certificate No. 19479

(EX 56-P), and drew the rest of

the money from his business accounts (EX 58-P; EX 68-P; TR-261).
After paying off said note, defendant SATHER requested
the FIRST SECURITY BANK to deliver to him the Deed of October ll,
1972 (EX 32-P), then being held by the FIRST SECURITy BANK under
the provisions of the Agreement between plaintiff and defendant
SATHER dated September 15, 1973 (EX 3-P).
BANK,

The FIRST SECURITY

....

in compliance with said request, on or about March 15, 1974,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-5- OCR, may contain errors.

delivered said Warranty DeeJ to defendant SATHER (EX 27-P;
TR-194).
On or about March 15, 1974, defendant ROBERT R. SATHER
entered into some arrangements with James A. Sheya to borrow
the sum of $70,000.00, which arrangements contemplated that
defendant SATHER would deed the Moss Ranch property to Sheya
as security for that loan.

Such a deed was recorded by defendant

SATHER on March 25, 1974, in the office of the Uintah County
Recorder (EX 9-P; EX 72-P).

However, no money was ever actually

advanced by Sheya to SATHER because it was then discovered by
defendant SATHER before he obtained any money from Sheya that
plaintiff on November 2, 1973, had caused a Trust Deed to be
recorded against the Moss Ranch ostensibly to secure a loan from
Silvio Fassio to plaintiff for the sum of $150,000.00 (EX 59-D;
TR-181,183,262,263).

A deed back from Sheya to defendant SATHER

was later recorded on May 15, 1975 (EX-10-P; TR-263).
When defendant ROBERT R. SATHER discovered the said
$150,000.00 Trust Deed on the county records in favor of Silvio
Fassio, he requested and received from the FIRST SECURITY BANK
an assignment of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust Deed dated
September 15, 1973, which had been paid off by defendant SATHER
on or about March 15, 1974.

This Assignment was dated and

delivered to defendant SATHER by FIRST SECURITY BANK on or about
April 5, 1974 (EX 48-P; TR-195,262).
During or about the month of April 1974, plaintiff
learned that the Deed of October 11, 1972 (EX 32-P) had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

delivered to the defendant SATHER by the FIRST SECURITY BANK
(TR-82,262).

Plaintiff at that time demanded a reconveyance of

the property, but defendant SATHER declined to do so until he
was paid the sum of $46,560.00 by plaintiff, which amount is the
sum defendant SATHER paid to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in connection
with defendant SATHER'S guarantee of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust
Deed Note (TR-86,261,264,265).
Plaintiff contended that the FIRST SECURITY BANK
should have never in any event delivered the Deed of October 11,
1972 (EX 32-P), to the defendants SATHER because the Agreement
of September 15, 1973 (EX 3-P), providing for delivery of the
deed to the Moss Ranch to the defendant SATHER in the event the
defendant SATHER paid off plaintiff's $50,000.00 note, was
cancelled by further agreement between plaintiff and defendant
SATHER as of September 16, 1973 (EX 4-P).

At the trial, defendant

SATHER did not deny that said document of cancellation (EX 4-P)
bore his signature, but he did not recall signing the same and
did not recall ever seeing such document until he was served
with a copy of the Complaint in this matter (TR-180,260).
Plaintiff testified that plaintiff's Exhibit #4 was signed by
defendant ROBERT SATHER at plaintiff's office in Torrence,
California on or about September 15, 1973 (TR-64,67).

Plaintiff

further testified and offered evidence that it notified the
FIRST SECURITY BANK of said cancellation (EX 4-P), both by
telephone and in writing, in December of 1973, and again in
March of 1974 (EX 5-P; EX 6-P; TR-70-76).

The officers of
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FIRST SECURITY BANK denied ever receiving any such notices of
cancellation, as did defendant SATHER (TR-260).
Plaintiff did not at any time tender any sum to
defendant SATHER for a reconveyance of the Hoss Ranch (TR-264-266),
although plaintiff did by letter addressed to defendant SATHER
on September 25, 1974, acknowledge a responsibility for the sum
of $46,000.00 in connection with the property in question
(EX 71-D).
Plaintiff filed suit on or about January 29, 1976,
against defendants SATHER (R 1-17) seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for the withholding of the property; to reform
the Warranty Deed of October 11, 1972 (EX 32-P), to a security
instrument securing the guarantee of defendant SATHER (EX 3-P;
EX 42-D); and to permit plaintiff to regain the Moss Ranch by
its paying to the defendant SATHER the amount of the plaintiff's
Trust Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 37-D), which had been
assigned by the FIRST SECURITY BANK to defendant SATHER (EX 48-P).
The case was tried to a jury.

At the close of

plaintiff's case, defendant SATHER moved the Court for a
directed verdict (TR-249), and the Court denied the motion with
leave to renew the motion at the conclusion of all of the
evidence (TR-268).

Defendants SATHER renewed their motion for

a directed verdict at the conclusion of all of the evidence
(TR-296), which motion was denied by the Court (TR-301).
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The case was thereupon submitted to the jury upon
special interrogatories (R 598-601).

The jury found that

defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was guilty of wilful and malicious
conduct toward the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff suffered
no damages by reason thereof, and that the plaintiff owed the
sum of $21,500.00 to the defendant SATHER in order to regain
possession of the Moss Ranch (R 600-601).
Defendants SATHER subsequently filed a Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

(R 605-608), and submitted

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lau and a proposed
Judgment on the Verdict which provided for interest on the money
found by the jury to be due from the plaintiff to the defendant
SATHER as a condition for the return of the Moss Ranch to the
plaintiff (R 625-626; R 653-657; R 661-666).

The court belou

denied defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdit, declined to award interest to the defendants SATHER
(R 669), and entered its Order and Judgment accordingly (R 670671).

From this Order and Judgment defendants SATHER have

taken their appeal (R 672-673).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE HAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
OF THE JURY TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT ROBERT R. SATHER WAS
GUILTY OF 1\fiLFUL AND NALICIOUS CONDUCT TOWARD THE PLAINTIFF
AND THE COURT BELOH ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE MOTION OF
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DEFENDANT SATHER FOR JUDGl1ENT NOT\HTHSTANDING THE VERDICT IN
RESPECT THEREOF.
Defendants recognize that under the law of this state,
the verdict of the jury and the actions of the trial court
thereon should be upheld unless it appears that the evidence
so clearly preponderates against them that it is evident an
injustice has resulted.

(BEZNER VS. CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS

INC., 548 P. 2d 898; UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION VS. THE STEELE
RANCH, 533 P. 2d 888; KOER VS MAYFAIR MARKETS, 19 Utah 2d 339,
431 P. 2d 566; TAYLOR VS. KEITH O'BRIEN INC., 537 P 2d 1022).
Defendants submit that the evidence in this case clearly
preponderates against a finding of malice on the part of
defendant ROBERT R. SATHER.
"Halice" means a motive and willingness to vex,
harass, annoy or injure (52 AH. JUR. 2d 161).
so instructed the jury (Inst. #25, R 516).

The court below

The evidence received

at the trial and offered by the plaintiff to support its contention that defendant ROBERT R. SATHER acted with malice shows
the follo>ving:
(a) Defendant ROBERT SATHER signed plaintiff's Exhibit #4
purporting to cancel the agreement between the parties
pertaining to the Warranty Deed from plaintiff to
defendant SATHER (EX 32-P; TR-64,67).
(b) Plaintiff had letters prepared and addressed to the
FIRST SECURITY BANK advising that the Agreement
between the plaintiff and the defendant SATHER with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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respect to the said Warranty Deed had been cancelled.
Said letters also contained wording to the effect
"cc: R.R. Sather and cc/Robert Sather" (EX 5-P; EX 6-P);
however, defendants cannot find in the record that
plaintiff presented evidence that copies of such
letters were actually mailed to the defendant
SATHER (TR-71).
(c) Pete Buffo, president of plaintiff, testified that
he talked to defendant ROBERT SATHER on the telephone
about the cancellation document in December of 1973
(TR-72).
(d) Defendant ROBERT SATHER did not tell the FIRST SECURITY
BANK about the cancellation document (EX 4-P) prior
to obtaining the Warranty Deed to the Moss Ranch from
the FIRST SECURITY BANK (TR-201,202).
(e) Defendant obtained the Warranty Deed from the plaintiff
to defendant SATHER from the FIRST SECURITY

BAW~

in

March of 1974 upon the strength of the agreement of
September 15, 1973 (EX 3-P), which plaintiff contended
was cancelled as of September 16, 1973 by plaintiff's
Exhibit ii4.
(f) Defendant SATHER attempted to encumber the Moss Ranch
to James A. Sheya on Harch 15, 1974 (EX 9-P; EX 72-P).
(g) Defendant SATHER obtained an Assignment of the First
Security Bank Trust Deed of September 15, 1973, on
April 5, 1974 (EX 48-P).

. ..
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Evidence in the record which belied any malice on the
part of defendant SATHER i.s as follo1vs:
(a)

Defendants SATHER personally guaranteed plaintiff's
$50,000.00 note of September 15, 1973 (EX 42-D).

(b)

Plaintiff defaulted in the payment of said note and
defendants SATHER paid the sum of $46,560.00 to the
FIRST SECURITY BANK pursuant to said guarantee
(EX 49-P; TR-39,143,194,260,261; EX 27-P).

(c)

Defendant SATHER was entitled to reimbursement from
plaintiff for such payment and was entitled to at
least a security interest in the Moss Ranch in
connection therewith.

Plaintiff acknowledged as

much by letter and in its Complaint (EX 71-D; R 4,5;
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7, R 556).
(d)

Defendant SATHER offered to release any interest in
the Moss Ranch to the plaintiff in exchange for
reimbursement for the payment made by the defendant
SATHER to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (TR-265).

(e)

The plaintiff did not at any time offer or tender
reimbursement to the defendant SATHER in any amount
(TR-264,265).
A fair interpretation of the evidence as a lvhole and

in a light most favorable to the finding of the jury on the issue
of malice does not demonstrate that the defendant acted maliciously
toward the plaintiff.

The defendant SATHER, by even the plaintiff's

standard, was entitled to assert a security interest in the Moss'
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Ranch and the actions of the defendant were not calculated to
do othenvise.

The evidenc.e is undisputed that the plaintiff

made no offer of any amount of money to secure a release of
defendant SATHER'S security interest in the property.

Defendant

SATHER conceded that the Warranty Deed was initially considered
to be a security device and his actions in taking an assignment
of the Trust Deed from the FIRST SECURITY BANK rather than
obtaining a release upon payment of the note o;.ms justifiably
precipitated by the defendant's discovery that the plaintiff
had encumbered the property for an additional $150,000.00
without the knowledge of the defendant SATHER within less than
t'ilO months after the defendant SATHER had personally guaranteed
plaintiff's note for $50,000.00 to the FIRST SECURITY BANK
(EX 59-D).

There is no reasonable basis in the evidence to
support a finding of malice on the part of defendant ROBERT R.
SATHER toward the plaintiff, and the finding of the jury to that
effect should be reversed.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FUlliNG BY THE JURY THAT THE
DEFENDAtlTS SATHER \-JERE ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE SUM OF $46,560.00,
PLUS INTEREST, FROM THE PLAINTIFF RATHER THAN ONLY THE SUM OF
$21,500.00.
With respect to the Moss Ranch, the real property
involved in this action, the jury found that the plaintiff was,.
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the owner thereof and that

~he

plaintiff was entitled to regain

possession upon payment of the sum of $21,500.00 to the defendants SATHER (R 600-601).

Defendants SATHER contend that there

was no credible evidence received at the trial to justify limiting defendants' entitlement to $21,500.00.

The only substantial

evidence before the Court requires a finding that defendants
SATHER were entitled to be awarded the sum of $46,560.00 as
their security interest in the Moss Ranch.
Defendants again recognize that the evidence on appeal
after a jury verdict is to be viewed and construed most strongly
in support of the jury's findings and that the Supreme Court
should not change the findings of the jury \vhere there is
competent evidence to sustain them.
CLEANERS INC., supra.)

(BEZNER VS. CONTINENTAL DRY

In this case the defendants submit that

there is no such evidence to sustain the finding of the jury on
this point.

Evidence before the jury not in dispute shows the

following:
(a)

Defendants SATHER personally guaranteed plaintiff's
$50,000.00 note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (EX 3-P;
EX 24-P; EX 42-P).

Plaintiff received all of the

proceeds from the loan (TR-35).
(b)

The loan approval required as further security a
pledge to the FIRST SECURITY BANK of a savings
certificate in the sum of $25,000.00 (EX 23-P).

(c)

Defendant SATHER received a $25,000.00 check from
plaintiff (EX 31-P).
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(d)

Defendant ROBERT 3ATHER purchased a $25,000.00
Savings Certificate No. 19479 from the FIRST
SECURITY BANK (EX 56-P) and pledged the same with
the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional collateral
for plaintiff's loan (EX 68-P).

(e)

Plaintiff defaulted under the terms of its said
note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (TR-136,261).

(f)

Defendant SATHER in March 1974, vlhen said note
was then delinquent, paid off the same to the FIRST
SECURITY BANK in the amount of $46,560.00 pursuant
to the terms of defendants' guarantee to the bank
(EX 49-P).

(g)

In order to raise the said sum of $46,560.00,
defendant SATHER cashed in Savings Certificate No.
19479 in the amount of $25,000.00 and made up the
difference from his business accounts (TR-261).

(h)

Defendant SATHER took an assignment of plaintiff's
note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK from the FIRST SECURITY
BANK so that defendants then became the owners of
said note and Trust Deed securing the same (EX 48-P).
Instruction #13 (R 504) given by the court below to

the jury, and to which the plaintiff took no exception (TR-309),
reads as follows:
"When one person guarantees to pay a past due
obligation that a debtor owes to a creditor, and
when the guarantor actually pays to the creditor
a past due obligation owed the creditor by the
debtor, the guarantor then stands in the shoes
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the creditor and is entitled to all rights
and security the creditor had against the debtor.
Therefore, if you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant ROBERT SATHER guaranteed
the obligation UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
owed to the defendant bank, and that after default
by UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROBERT SATHER
paid the bank the money that UTE-CAL owed by reason
of UTE-CAL'S default, then upon payment, MR. SATHER
was entitled to have assigned to him all rights the
bank originally had against UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, including the assignment of the bank's
interest in the Trust Deed of September 15, 1973."
The only possible evidence in the record of the trial
to justify reducing defendant SATHER'S claim under the said
security arrangement to $21,500.00, rather than the $46,560.00
actually paid by defendant SATHER on plaintiff's note to the
FIRST SECURITY BANK arises from the circumstances as above
indicated, whereby defendant SATHER received $25,000.00 from
plaintiff in the form of a check shortly after plaintiff received
the proceeds of plaintiff's loan from the FIRST SECURITY BANK;
defendant SATHER thereupon used said check to purchase a
$25,000.00 savings certificate and pledged said certificate with
the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security for plaintiff's
loan; and thereafter used the proceeds of such savings certificate toward paying off the plaintiff's note to FIRST SECURITY
BANK after such note became delinquent.

In other words, it is

plaintiff's contention and the jury in effect found that
plaintiff only really borrowed $25,000.00 from the FIRST SECURITY
BANK even though its note as guaranteed by defendants SATHER was
for $50,000.00, because the $25,000.00 which was given to SATHER
by plaintiff was used by SATHER to buy a savings certificate ...
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which was ultimately used by the defendant SATHER to partially
pay off the very loan which generated the $25,000.00 made
available to SATHER by plaintiff in the first place.
Whether defendant SATHER'S receipt of the $25,000.00
from plaintiff was in itself a loan from plaintiff to defendants
SATHER as contended by plaintiff (TR- 64,65,67), or a payment
to defendant SATHER on a previous debt owed by plaintiff as
contended by defendant SATHER (TR-257,258; EX 60-D; EX 71-D)
really is immaterial.

In either event, the $25,000.00 received

by defendant SATHER from the plaintiff was defendant SATHER'S
money.

What defendant SATHER did with it was of no concern to

the plaintiff.

If in fact the money was a loan from the

plaintiff to defendant SATHER, there is absolutely no evidence
in the record to indicate when the money was to be repaid by
defendant SATHER or that it was due when defendant SATHER paid
off the FIRST SECURITY BANK in March of 1974, or that it was
due at any other time up to and including trial of the case, so
as to permit the plaintiff to rightfully claim an offset against
the money paid by defendant SATHER on plaintiff's note to the
FIRST SECURITY BANK in the amount of $46,560.00.
There was absolutely no evidence before the jury upon
which they could rightfully base a finding that defendants
SATHER were entitled to anything less than the sum of $46,500.00
in satisfaction of defendant's security interest in the Moss
Ranch and this Court on appeal should so hold.

This Court
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stated in the case of

LEt-1MOt~

VS. DENVER & RIO GRANDE vJESTERN

RAILROAD COMPANY (9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P. 2d 215) as follows:
"One of its most fundamental tenets is that the
determination of the facts is left exclusively
to the jury.
It is not our prerogative to let
our suspicions or predilections obscure our
duty to abide by that rule.
The only limitation
thereon is that if findings are made which are
not supported by any substantial evidence, or
the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds
would find one way, so that a verdict contrary
thereto must have resulted from passion or
prejudice, or misconception of the law or the
evidence, or in arbitrary disregard thereof, the
court will exercise its inherent supervisory
powers to administer justice, and will set the
verdict aside."
Defendants respectfully submit that the present case
is one in which the Court should exercise its inherent supervisory powers to administer justice and determine that because
of the evidence before the Court, defendants' basic entitlement
from the plaintiff is the sum of $46,560.00, rather than the
sum of $21,500.00 as found by the jury.

POINT Ill
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTEREST
TO DEFENDANTS SATHER ON THE AHOUNT DUE FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO
THE DEFENDANTS SATHER.
Plaintiff in its Complaint alleges the validity of
plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust Deed and Note to the FIRST SECURITY
BANK, which Note and Trust Deed were paid by the defendants
SATHER and then assigned to the defendants SATHER by the
FIRST SECURITY BANK (R 4; EX 37-D; EX 48-P).

The jury found

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-18Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

that the defendant SATHER wols entitled to be reimbursed for
only the sum of $21,500.00 ciut of the total sum of $46,560.00
paid by defendant SATHER to the FIRST SECURITY BANK on March 15,
1974 (R 600-601; EX 49-P).
Defendants seek interest on such sum and any additional
sum which this Court may allow from March 14, 1974, until payment
is made by the plaintiff.

In Point II above, defendants have

addressed their position to the effect that the jury was in
error, reversible by this Court, for failing to find that
defendants were entitled to reimbursement from the plaintiff
for the full amount of $46,560.00 paid by the defendant SATHER
to the FIRST SECURITY BANK under defendant SATHER'S guarantee
of plaintiff's said note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK.
No specific reference to interest was included in
the special interrogatories submitted to the jury (R 598-601),
but defendants SATHER submit that the law and equity nevertheless
allow and require the Court to assess interest on the amount
due defendants from the plaintiff.

The Trust Deed Note under

which plaintiff concedes liability in some amount provides for
interest at the rate of 12% per annum (EX 24-P).

Even in the

absence of such a provision, the law would impose a legal rate
of interest of 6% per annum.

(See SECTION 15-1-1, UTAH CODE

ANNOTATED 1953, as amended).

This Court has previously held in

the case of WASATCH MINING COMPANY VS. CRESENT HINING COMPANY,
7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586, that:
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"Interest is allowed on debts overdue, even
in the absence of statute or contract providing
therefor."
Defendants SATHER, in their Answer and Counterclaim,
prayed:
"For such other relief as to the court may seem
equitable and just".
(R-29)
The pleadings of plaintiff and the evidence at the
trial clearly sho'v that defendants SATHER, under their personal
guarantee, paid money owed by the plaintiff on which an obligation for interest existed (EX 24-P).

The general prayer of

defendants SATHER is adequate to support an award of interest
under such circumstances.
JUR. 2d 384).

(See 61 Al'1. JUR. 2d SSLf-555; 22 AM.

As pointed out in the case of SEARS, ROEBUCK

&

COMPANY VS. BLADE, 294 P. 2d 140 (California):
"The matter of interest for withholding of money
is 'embraced within the issues' and the appropriate interest may be allowed even though not
prayed for or the prayer is for less interest
than the evidence shows to be allowable."
The issue of interest was not specifically submitted
to the jury, but it was an issue within the facts and evidence
of the case as to which the Court might make a finding.

A

federal case in point, decided under RULE 49 OF THE FEDERAL
RUT>ES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which rule is similar to SECTION 49
of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, is the case of HOURIKAS VS.
VARDIANOS, 169 FED. 2d 53, in >vhich the Court held:
"No interrogatory was submitted to the jury as to
interest, and neither plaintiff nor defendants
made any demand that the question of interest
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be submitted to trre jury. Rule 49 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedur~ 'Special Verdicts and
Interrogatories', provides in part 'as to an issue
omitted without such demand, the Court may make a
finding; or if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed
to have made a finding in accord with the judgment
on the verdict'.
It therefore see~s clear that it
was entirely proper for the Court, after return of
the special verdict, to pass upon the question of
interest, although ordinarily the question of
whether or not interest should be allowed and from
what date is for the jury."
RULE 49(a) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
provides in part as follows:
"The court shall give to the jury, such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its
findings upon each issue.
If in so doing, the Court
omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or
by the evidence, each party waives his right to a
trial by jury of the issue so omitted, unless before
the jury retires, he demands its submission to the
jury. As to any issue omitted without such demand,
the court may make a finding; or if it fails to do
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accordance with the "ud ment of the s ecial verdict."
Un erlining a
Defendants, pursuant to RULE 49(a), UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, submitted proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and a proposed Judgment on the Verdict to
the court below relative to the award of interest to the
defendants (R 625-626; R 653-657; R 665-666).

The court below

declined to sign the same and denied the defendants' motion to
add interest (R 669-670).

For the reasons and based upon the

authorities above cited, defendants submit that the court below
was in error in refusing to add interest to the amount owing
from plaintiff to the defendants and they urge this Court on
appeal to so hold.
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CONCLUSION
The verdict of

t~e

jury with respect to its finding

of wilful and malicious action on the part of defendant ROBERT R.
SATHER toward the plaintiff is not supported by any competent
or substantial evidence.

The verdict of the jury with respect

to its finding that the defendants SATHER are only entitled to
reimbursement from the plaintiff for the sum of $21,500.00 of
the $46,560.00 paid by the defendants on plaintiff's past due
Trust Deed Note, guaranteed by the defendants, is likewise not
supported by any competent or substantial evidence.

This Court,

in the interest of justice, should reverse the finding of
malicious conduct on the part of defendant ROBERT R. SATHER,
and should award the defendants SATHER the full sum of
$46,560.00 against the plaintiff as reimbursement for their
payment of plaintiff's obligation to the FIRST SECURITY BANK.
The refusal of the court below to add interest to the
amount due from the plaintiff to the defendants is likewise not
supported by the

la•>~

and equity, and the ruling of the court

below in that regard should be reversed.
In any event, should this Court decline to grant the
affirmative relief sought herein by the defendants SATHER, the
defendants SATHER should be granted a new trial on the issues
herein raised.
Res ectfully su

Ltted,
~

{:7·"/

L

cr:, ( /{.,LJ_(-.;-uDJ

ullen Y.
hristensen, for •..
CHRISTENi N, TAYLOR & MOODY
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